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APPENDIX

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Southern District of Indiana

Indianapolis Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN, et al., Plaintiffs, *vs.* THE BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF INDIANAPOLIS, et al *Defendants.*	Cause No. IP-68-C-225

EXCERPTS FROM SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF DECISION (December 6, 1973)

I. *Introduction*

Heretofore, on August 18, 1971, the Court filed herein its Memorandum of Decision, incorporating its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and making certain interim orders, with respect to the issues presented by the complaint of the original plantiff, United States of America, and the answer of the original defendants, The Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, the individual members of such Board, and the Board's appointed Superintendent of schools. Such decision, which will be referred to hereafter as *"Indianapolis I,"* is reported in 332 F. Supp. 655, aff'd 474 F. 2d 81 (7 Cir. 1973), cert. den. 37 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1973).

Thereafter, on July 20, 1973, the Court filed herein a second Memorandum of Decision, incorporating its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and making certain interim orders, with respect to certain issues presented by the complaint of the original

and added plaintiffs, Donny Brurell Buckley, et al, and the answers of the original and added defendants. Such decision will be referred to hereafter as *"Indianapolis II,"* is reported in ..... F. Supp. ....., 37 Ind. Dec. 524, and is now on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Nos. 73-1968 to 73-1984, incl.

The key decision made in *Indianapolis I* was that the Indianapolis public school system (hereafter "IPS") was being operated by the original defendants, and had been operated by their predecessors in office, as a system practicing *de jure* segregation of students of the Negro race. It was therefore held that the Negro students were being denied the equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Certain interim measures tending to prevent further segregation were ordered, pending consideration of the questions to be presented and later decided in *Indianapolis II*, it being understood that the law required the defendants to take affirmative action to desegregate IPS *Green* v. *Country School Board*, 391 U. S. 430 (1968).

The key decisions made in *Indianapolis II* were that (1) as a practical matter, desegregation promising a reasonable degree of permanence could not be accomplished within the present boundaries of IPS, and (2) added defendant officials of the State of Indiana, their predecessors in office, the added defendant The Indiana State Board of Education, and the State itself have, by various acts and omissions, promoted segregation and inhibited desegregation within IPS, so that the State, as the agency ultimatedy charged under Indiana law with the operation of the public schools, has an affirmative duty to desegregate IPS.

The Court also held in *Indianapolis II* that IPS could be effectively desegregated either by combining its territory with that of all or part of the territory served by certain added defendant school corporations, into a metropolitan system or systems, and then reassigning pupils within the expanded system or systems thus created, or by transferring Negro students from IPS to

added defendant school corporations, either on a one-way or an exchange basis. It further held that the State, through its General Assembly, should be first afforded the opportunity to select its own plan, but that if it failed to do so within a reasonable time, the Court would have the power and the duty to promulgate its own plan, and place it in effect. *Bradley, et al,* v. *Milliken, et al,* ..... F. 2d ..... (6 Cir. 1973). See *Baker* v. *Carr,* 369 U. S. 186 (1962); *Reynolds* v. *Sims,* 377 U. S. 533 (1964).

By way of affirmative relief pending action by the General Assembly, the Court ordered IPS to effect pupil reassignments for the 1973-74 school year sufficient to bring the number of Negro pupils in each of its elementary schools to approximately 15%, which has been accomplished. The Court also directed IPS to transfer to certain added defendant school corporations, and for such corporations to receive and enroll, a number of Negro students equal to 5% of the 1972-73 enrollment of each transferee school, with certain exceptions. This order was, on August 8, 1973, stayed by the Court until the 1973-74 school year by an order made in open court but not previously reduced to writing.

At this time, certain matters have been presented to the Court, both formally and informally, which require further rulings in the premises. Such rulings are now made, as hereafter set out, as supplementary to or, in some instances, in lieu of rulings heretofore entered in *Indianapolis II,* as heretofore modified.

* * * * *

IV. Guidelines of this Court—General

It is, of course, recognized by the Court that it cannot issue a positive order to the General Assembly to enact specific legislation. It is for such reason that the Court has suggested several different methods by which the General Assembly could approach the problem of effectively desegregating IPS,

and it does not imply that there may not be other equally effective methods which may occur to that body.

Within the context of what has been suggested as possible alternatives, however, the Court offers further observations, as follows:

(1) With respect to the concept of one metropolitan school district, embracing the area designated in Figure 1, attached to the Court's opinion in *Indianapolis II*, it is apparent that some advantages would be obtained from such a system. To name a few, a uniform tax base would be provided for the education of the more than 200,000 pupils in the combined system, and economy in operation could be achieved through central purchasing and reduction of administrative overhead. Complete desegregation would be simplified. On the other hand, it may be that such a system would be too large in terms of difficulty of administration and remoteness of the central office from school patrons.

(2) With respect to the concept of creating various new metropolitan districts—for example, six or eight to replace the present twenty-four pictured on Figure 1, it is apparent that some of the advantages above noted would be reduced, and some of the disadvantages improved. Another alternate of course, would be to create one metropolitan system for taxing purposes, which in turn would be subdivided into several semi-autonomous local districts. So long as IPS and the local districts are each effectively desegregated, the method used would be constitutionally immaterial.

(3) With respect to the concept of permitting the present school corporations shown on said Figure 1 to remain as is, insofar as geography and control is concerned, such a solution would of course preserve local autonomy, and this Court would have no reason to disapprove such a solution, so long as each such corporation is required to participate in the desegregation of IPS. Put in other terms, local autonomy for such corporations is, under the law of Indiana, a privilege—not a right—all

as discussed in detail in *Indianapolis II*. The consideration for permitting the various corporations to continue their separate existences might therefore be stated to be their participation in a meaningful plan to desegregate IPS. Some of the pertinent facts which the General Assembly may wish to consider in this regard are set out in the next two sections hereof.

V. Transfer of Pupils

When speaking of the transfer of pupils, the first logical question is as to the numbers involved. In this connection, the focus must be on the elementary schools within IPS which were not affected by the interim plan adopted by the Court for the present school year, and which have an enrollment of Negro pupils exceeding 80%. There are nineteen such schools, fourteen of which have Negro enrollments in excess of 97%. Two additional schools have enrollments exceeding 60%, and should also be considered. The total enrollment of black students in these 21 schools, excluding kindergarten and special education students, is approximately 11,500.

The General Assembly might order the exchange of all or a substantial part of these 11,500 students with students from the suburban school corporations. For purposes of illustration, if it were determined to desegregate such schools on the basis of approximately 85% white—15% black, then about 9,775 black children would need to be transferred to suburban schools, and about the same number of non-black children would need to be transferred to IPS.

There is case law to the effect that transfers of students must be made on an approximately equal basis insofar as the races are concerned, unless there is good reason why this should not be done. In such cases it has been held that to impose the "burden" of being transported wholly or largely upon students of one race is yet another from of racial discrimination and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the group transported. *United States* v. *Texas Educa-*

tion Agency, 467 F. 2d 848 (5 Cir. 1972); *Lee* v. *Macon County Board of Education*, 448 F. 2d 746 (5 Cir. 1971); *Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier County*, 429 F. 2d 364 (8 Cir. 1970). Such cases, if followed, would seem to mandate so-called "two-way" busing, absent compelling reasons to the contrary.

The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed itself to this question. However, it is worthy of note that in *McDaniel* v. *Barresi*, 402 U. S. 39 (1971), that Court approved a desegregation plan adopted by the Clarke County (Ga.) Board of Education which reassigned pupils in five heavily Negro "'pockets'" to other attendance zones, busing many of them, without any corresponding busing of whites. Other "one-way" busing plans have likewise been approved, depending on the factual setting. *Hart* v. *County School Board*, 459 F. 2d 981 (4 Cir. 1972); *Norwalk Core* v. *Norwalk Board of Education*, 423 F. 2d 121 (2 Cir. 1970). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has flatly held that a pattern of assigning Negro students to formerly all-white schools, without requiring similar travel on the part of whites, does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Allen* v. *Asheville City Board of Education*, 434 F. 2d 902 (4 Cir. 1970). Moreover, analysis of the cases cited in the preceding paragraph indicates that they have been decided on their particular facts, even though some of the language is in terms of absolute requirements.

The Court does not find it necessary to attempt to resolve this question in terms of constitutional absolutes, nor could it appropriately do so on the present record, since the question has not been squarely presented. However, the record does contain undisputed evidence that virtually all of the twenty-one IPS elementary schools above referred to (located as shown in Figure 13, attached) are substantially out of line with the requirements of present Indiana law and regulations establishing minimum acreage requirements for elementary schools. The regulations require seven acres for schools with 200 or less

pupils, plus an additional acre for each additional 100 pupils or major fraction thereof. Burns Indiana Rules & Regs., § (28-415)-3. As reflected in Figure 14, attached, only one of these schools meets acreage requirements. Most schools are grossly deficient in the space required—for example, the pupil density at School 66 is 544.21 pupils per acre, and is 493.57 per acre at School 42 and 481.33 per acre at School 73. By way of comparison, the pupil density at School 42, taking into consideration its enrollment and the State formula, should be 57.58 pupils per acre. It is thus overcrowded by 857.18%!

The evidence further shows that, with a few exceptions, the twenty-one schools in question are among the older schools in the IPS system—some dating back 100 years, more or less. Although there is no evidence that the Board of School Commissioners has not maintained such schools as well as could be expected under the circumstances, it is a fair inference, subject to further proof, that the type of construction, use of flammable materials, etc., would fail by a wide margin to meet safety standards for newly constructed schools. On the other hand, the evidence discloses that the school plants maintained by added defendant school corporations are, for the most part, relatively new and in compliance with acreage and safety standards.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, therefore, this Court would not feel justified in condemning out of hand a "one-way" suburban busing plan involving pupils from such of the twenty-one schools as may seem to the Board, on analysis, to afford inadequate educational plant facilities, viewed in the light of current standards. Additionally, such a plan would involve transportation of substantially fewer pupils, and therefore be less expensive.

Finally, unless convinced to the contrary by additional evidence in an appropriate hearing, this Court is not prepared to characterize busing as an unmitigated "burden." Although it might appear to a child to be "burdensome" to be deprived

of walking to school in the warm days of May and September (which presupposes that children do not like to ride in motor vehicles with their neighborhood friends—a somewhat novel concept to the Court), the Court doubts that it would seem such a burden to be transported in a heated bus through the rain, sleet, and snow so familiar in this latitude during other months of the school term. As pointed out in *Indianapolis II*, nearly 80% of suburban pupils (more than 80% since the elimination of Greenfield) are bused to school at the present time, without complaint.

The Court is not of the opinion that it would be wise to require transportation of kindergarten pupils, primarily because of their age, nor to transport special education pupils because of the various special problems which would inevitably arise in this regard. Further, the Court recognizes that special problems arise with respect to high school pupils, which might render their transfer counter-productive once their high school training has begun. As to pupils in grades 1-8, however, the Court knows of no reason why transfer of pupils, in whatever fashion the General Assembly may elect, would not be reasonable and practical to accomplish the constitutional duty imposed by the Supreme Court, with the understanding, of course, that a transferred elementary pupil would thereafter routinely continue to be transferred to the same transferee school corporation for continued education through high school.

If, for example, transfer were made of Negro pupils from those of the twenty-one schools failing to meet modern standards to the schools of added defendants situate within the geographical area depicted in said Figure 1, all of those transferred would be afforded education in a desegregated setting. It should be no great task to desegregate the remaining school or schools within IPS. The Court estimates, based on the statistics and projections in the record, that it would be necessary for the suburban schools within such Figure 1 area, excluding the Washington Township and Pike Township schools,

to accept transfer of IPS elementary pupils in grades 1-8 in number equivalent to approximately 15% of their 1973-74 enrollments in the same grades in order to accomplish this result.

After such transfers were accomplished, the racial percentages in each school to which transfers were made would be approximately 87% white and 13% Negro—a ratio which, by coincidence, would approximate that of the nation as a whole. As regards Washington Township, its minority percentage as projected for the present school year is already this high, so that general 1-8 transfers to this defendant would not appear to be indicated; however, the acceptance of pupil initiated transfers from IPS to its Everett J. Light Industrial Center, to the extent that vacancies exist, might well be required. Pike Township likewise has a substantial minority percentage at this time; however, a number of transfers sufficient to increase such percentage to a figure approximating that of the other suburban schools should be considered.

VI. Costs and Mechanics of Transfers

One advantage of the dual transfer system would be that if approximately equal numbers of pupils were transferred to and from suburban schools, tuition, transportation, and other costs would balance out as between IPS and the various other corporations, and no additions to school plants would be necessary. On the other hand, more pupils would be transported, thus increasing this total cost, and such a system would continue the use of the IPS antique buildings and grounds.

A one-way transfer plan would involve substantial tuition payments from IPS to the transferee schools. To the extent that such tuition applied only to the actual per capita cost of instruction, utilities, maintenance service, etc., no hardship would be imposed upon IPS, because it is apparant that IPS expense for such services would be correspondingly reduced. However, the

present transfer law, I.C. 1971, 20-8.1-6-1 through 20-8.1-6-15, as amended, Burns §§ 28-5001 through 28-5015, also contemplate charges related to the fair value of the transferee school plant, tax levies for building purposes, and other items related to capital outlay of the transferee school. Considering that the State of Indiana is itself at fault in this matter, as previously found, the General Assembly should consider whether the State should be required to contribute the necessary amount to compensate the transferee corporations for the use of their respective plants. Such a provision, with an appropriate formula, could be adopted as an amendment to the existing transfer law.

It is possible that the General Assembly could discharge its duty in this matter simply by amending the existing transfer law. The purpose of such law, as the Court understands it, is to permit the better accommodation of school children. As pointed out in Section III hereof, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that for a minority child to be compelled to attend a segregated school denies the Fourteenth Amendment rights of such child: in effect, the child is not properly accommodated. Therefore, if the transfer law were amended to recognize transfers to accomplish desegregation of a school system which has been finally adjudged to have been segregated *de jure* (as is true in the case of IPS), a basis would be established for other necessary changes regarding time of payment of tuition, the share to be borne by the State, the matter of responsibility for and payment of the cost of transportation, and similar details. Since the actual number or percentage of pupils to be transferred is more of an administrative detail than a legislative function, this matter could be left to the discreation of the local school board or boards, subject to the approval of the court having jurisdiction of the case.

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GROWTH OF NON-WHITE POPULATION IN MAJOR CENTRAL CITIES - 1960-1970

Name of SMSA	(1) Total SMSA Population & Net Change 1960-1970	(2) Total Central City White Population & Change 1960-1970	(3) Total Central City Non-White Population & Change 1960-1970	(4) Total Central City Population & Change 1960-1970	(5) Total Central City White Population Net Migration	(6) Total Central City Non-White Population Net Migration	(7) Excess of Non-White Growth Rate Over White Growth Rate in Central City (Col. 3 less Col. 2)
New York, N.Y.	7.8	- 9.3	61.6	[illegible].1	-955,500	435,000	70.9
Los Angeles-Long Beach, Cal.	16.4	4.7	55.6	12.5	- 67,200	127,700	50.9
Chicago, Ill.	12.2	-18.6	38.4	- 5.2	-645,600	113,200	57.0
Philadelphia, Pa.-N.J.	10.9	12.9	25.2	- 2.7	-246,400	39,600	12.3
Detroit, Mich.	11.6	-29.1	38.1	- 9.5	-386,800	97,500	67.2
San Francisco, Oakland, Cal.	17.4	-17.2	31.3	- 2.8	-154,500	66,900	48.5
Washington, D.C. Md.-Va.	38.6	-39.4	30.7	- 1.0	-138,300	38,300	70.1
Boston, Mass. SMSA	6.1	-16.5	69.9	- 8.1	-130,600	26,500	86.4
Pittsburgh, Pa.	- 0.2	-18.0	6.0	-13.9	- 99,100	- 6,400	24.0
St. Louis, Mo.-Ill.	12.3	-31.6	19.1	-17.0	-181,800	- 900	50.7
Baltimore, Md.	14.8	-21.4	29.7	- 3.5	-149,700	31,700	51.1
Cleveland, Ohio	8.1	-26.8	15.7	-14.3	-206,400	- 2,800	42.2
Houston, Texas	40.0	-25.5	58.9	31.4	67,200	35,600	25.4
Newark, N.J.	9.9	-36.7	53.6	- 5.6	-106,600	31,500	90.3
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.	22.4	- 7.9	49.8	- 6.1	- 94,400	7,200	57.7
Dallas, Tex.	39.0	39.2	[illegible].3	24.[illegible]	[illegible].500	46,[illegible]	32.1
Seattle-Everett, Wash.	28.4	- 8.5	43.5	- 4.4	- 72,600	9,800	52.0
Anaheim-Santa-Ana-Garden Grove, Cal.	101.8	50.8	301.6	54.4	(NA)	(NA)	250.8
Milwaukee, Wisc.	9.8	-10.4	69.9	- 3.3	-128,400	22,000	80.3
Atlanta, Ga.	36.7	-20.8	37.3	2.0	- 82,500	32,700	57.3
Cincinnati, Ohio, Ky-Ind.	9.2	-17.2	15.9	-10.0	-106,100	- 2,500	33.1
Paterson-Clifton-Passaic, N.J.	14.5	- 9.1	98.1	1.0	- 25,500	9,800	107.2
San Diego, Cal.	31.4	17.2	72.8	21.6	27,600	17,300	55.6
Buffalo, N.Y.	3.2	-28.7	34.1	-13.1	-111,100	9,000	54.8
Miami, Fla.	35.6	13.5	19.3	14.8	29,400	- 5,700	5.8
Kansas City, Mo.-Kans.	14.8	0	37.3	6.6	- 28,800	13,000	37.3
Denver, Colo.	32.1	- 0.1	68.2	4.2	- 41,100	12,200	68.3
San Bernardino, Riverside, Ontario, Cal.	41.2	33.7	111.1	38.4	(NA)	(NA)	77.4
Indpls., Ind.	17.5	9.8	36.0	13.6	- 17,400	15,400	26.2
San Jose, Cal.	65.8	111.4	318.6	118.3	(NA)	(NA)	207.2
New Orleans, La.	15.3	-17.6	14.9	- 5.4	- 91,600	-10,500	32.5
Tampa, St. Petersburg, Fla.	31.1	5.2	24.8	8.3	24,900	24,800	19.6
Portland, Ore.-Wash.	22.8	0.2	43.3	2.7	- 7,600	4,700	43.1
Phoenix, Ariz.	45.8	31.2	52.2	32.4	71,500	5,600	21.0
Columbus, Ohio	21.4	11.3	30.8	14.5	- 10,600	9,400	19.5
Providence, Pawtucket, Warwick, R.I.-Mass., SMSA	10.9	- 6.8	48.8	- 4.8	- 40,000	2,600	55.6
Rochester, N.Y.	20.5	-17.1	115.1	- 7.0	- 68,500	16,600	132.2
San Antonio, Texas	20.6	9.8	30.6	11.3	- 32,300	5,300	20.8
Dayton, Ohio	16.9	-17.8	30.7	- 7.1	- 60,300	6,100	48.5

U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States - 1972, Section 31, page 837, et seq.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1972, RPT. P-23 NO. 26, (1973)

TABLE 59. SELECTED DATA ON BIRTH EXPECTATIONS FOR REPORTING WIVES, 18 TO 39 YEARS OLD: 1967 AND 1972

Subject	Total, 18 to 39 years	Age of Wife			
		18 to 24	25 to 29	30 to 34	35 to 39
1967					
Total number of reporting wives:					
Negro----------thousands-	1,280	342	307	309	321
White----------thousands-	14,440	3,798	3,420	3,390	3,831
Average number of births to date:					
Negro----------	3.2	1.8	3.0	3.9	4.2
White----------	2.4	1.1	2.3	3.0	3.1
Average number of total births expected:					
Negro----------	3.7	2.8	3.4	4.3	4.2
White----------	3.1	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.2
Percent of expected children already born:					
Negro----------	87	64	88	92	98
White----------	77	39	75	93	97
1972					
Total number of reporting wives:					
Negro----------thousands--	1,449	400	353	347	348
White----------thousands--	16,681	4,670	4,392	3,909	3,711
Average number of births to date:					
Negro----------	2.7	1.3	2.1	3.5	3.9
White----------	2.0	0.9	1.8	2.7	3.1
Average number of total births expected:					
Negro----------	3.2	2.4	2.8	3.7	4.0
White----------	2.6	2.2	2.4	2.8	3.2
Percent of expected children already born:					
Negro----------	84	55	76	95	99
White----------	77	40	74	94	99

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration Bureau of the Census.

EXCERPTS FROM BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, BIRTH EXPECTATIONS OF AMERICAN WIVES JUNE 1973, RPT. P-20, NO. 254, TABLE 1

Table 1. Births to Date, Additional Births Expected, and Total Births Expected Per 1,000 Wives 18 to 39 Years Old Reporting on Expectations, by age, and by race and Spanish Origin for selected years: 1967 to 1973
(Civilian noninstitutional population)

Subject and age of wife	All Races				White			Negro			Spanish origin
	1973	1972	1971	1967	1973	1972	1967	1973	1972	1967	1973
Births To Date Per 1,000 Wives											
18 to 39 years	2,044	2,090	2,146	2,427	2,008	2,039	2,357	2,540	2,688	3,193	2,447
18 to 24 years	895	928	952	1,173	848	893	1,116	1,372	1,325	1,787	1,109
18 and 19 years	588	608	571	731	540	565	654	(B)	(B)	(B)	(B)
20 and 21 years	743	721	771	970	697	661	893	1,218	1,258	1,657	(B)
22 to 24 years	1,049	1,098	1,124	1,366	1,004	1,073	1,317	1,502	1,435	2,015	1,282
25 to 29 years	1,755	1,807	1,949	2,312	1,723	1,781	2,255	2,210	2,147	2,996	2,217
30 to 34 years	2,623	2,749	2,802	3,050	2,589	2,681	2,974	3,089	3,548	3,929	3,316
35 to 39 years	3,189	3,173	3,210	3,214	3,149	3,109	3,130	3,857	3,945	4,157	3,641

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BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1972, RPT. P-23 NO. 26, (1973)

TABLE 46. SCHOOL ENROLLMENT OF PERSONS 3 TO 34 YEARS OLD, BY LEVEL: 1967 AND 1972

(Numbers in thousands. Minus sign (-) denotes decrease)

Level of school and race	1967	1972	Percent change
BLACK			
Total	6,826	7,959	16.6
rsery	140	185	32.1
ndergarten	418	448	7.2
ementary school	4,618	4,573	-1.0
gh school	1,651	2,025	22.7
llege	370	727	96.5
WHITE			
Total	43,816	51,314	17.1
rsery	564	1,079	91.3
ndergarten	2,840	2,633	-7.3
mentary school	28,415	27,185	-4.3
gh school	11,997	12,959	8.0
llege	5,905	7,458	26.3

Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census.

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OPTIMUM SCHOOL DISTRICT SIZE

by Michael E. Hickey

December 1969

Table V.

Summary of Optimum Size Recommendations

Criterion	Optimum Size	Source
Community control	50,000 total population	Havighurst (1968)
Community control	7,000-8,000 pupils	Havighurst (1968)
General quality	10,000 pupils (min.)	State of California
General quality	28,000 pupils	Swanson (1962)
General quality	50,000 pupils	Benson (1965)
General quality	1,500 pupils (min.)	Conant (1969)
General quality	10,000 pupils	Packard (1963)
General quality	25,000 pupils	Comm. for Economic Development (1960)
Quality/economy	10,000-20,000 pupils	Faber (1966)
Quality/economy	5,000 pupils (min.)	Fitzwater (1958)
Quality/economy	5,000-6,000 pupils (min.)	McClure
Quality/economy	12,000 pupils	Dawson (1948)
Effectiveness	10,000 pupils	Nat. Comm. on School District Reorg. (1948)
Cost/pupil	50,000 pupils	Hanson (1962)
Tax effort required	12,000 pupils	Vincent (1966)
Special staffing	25,000 pupils	Vincent (1966)
Net current expenditure	50,000 pupils	Vincent (1966)
Elementary school unit	500 pupils (max.)	NEA DEP (1954)
Secondary school unit	700-1,000 pupils	White House Conf. on Education
Administrative decentralization	300,000-500,000 total pop.	Havighurst (1968)
Administrative decentralization	20,000 pupils	Passow (1967)
Administrative decentralization	12,000-40,000 pupils	Bundy (1967)
Administrative district	20,000-50,000 pupils	IAR, Columbia Univ. (1961)
Administrative district	15,000-20,000 pupils	Peabody Coll. (1965)
Administrative district	10,000-12,000 pupils	AASA (1959)
Special Services:		
Adult education	20,000 (min.)	Great Plains School District Organization Project (1968)
Business administration	35,000-50,000 pupils	
Electronic Data Processing	100,000 pupils	
Special Education	20,000 pupils	